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As a sensitive area in international trade, animal welfare measures have encountered resistance
in negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently, alternative avenues
have been pursued to reach international trade policy convergence. To further understand
the contemporary trade politics of animal welfare, an empirical investigation was conducted
on the interplay between European and Brazilian actors in the context of livestock
production. By drawing upon diplomatic studies and the global governance literature, this
study identiﬁes and analyses initiatives that parallel the WTO approach and through which
the development and implementation of mutually acceptable farm animal welfare measures
have been pursued. Research ﬁndings indicate that a constellation of international non-
diplomatic actors are currently engaged in inﬂuencing the future development of farm
animal welfare measures. Among the initiatives that enable the alignment of European and
Brazilian animal welfare policies and practices, there are soft instruments such as
knowledge sharing and private standards. The rise of new actors and the use of soft
instruments have been, to a certain extent, able to mitigate the tardiness of a WTO
consensus regarding the use of animal welfare measures. However, there are concerns that
the use of private standards has become a shortcut to circumvent the rigours of the
multilateral trading system. This concern deserves a closer look because instead of paving
the way, private standards may hamper trade relations which in turn hamper progress in
animal welfare matters.
Keywords: animal welfare; trade relations; EU–Brazil; international governance; private
standards
1. Introduction
As national economies grow more interconnected, domestic concerns over the welfare of animals
used for food production have evolved into an international trade issue (Bayvel & Cross, 2010;
Blandford, Bureau, Fulponi, & Henson, 2002; Cook & Bowles, 2010; Hobbs, Hobbs, Isaac, &
Kerr, 2002; Thiermann & Babcock, 2005; Stevenson, 2009). The adoption of restrictive commer-
cial measures based on animal welfare criteria is, however, a highly controversial topic for
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The growing importance of animal welfare
and the need for the WTO to provide a framework within which WTO members could address
animal welfare issues were highlighted by the then-European Community in 2000 during a
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special session of the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture (G/AG/NG/W/19). According to the
European Community, there are several ways the issue of animal welfare could be addressed
in the WTO framework, such as in the negotiations of article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
The European Union (EU) proposal, however, did not receive widespread support among WTO
members. A number of countries indicated that they were not indifferent to animal welfare matters
but rejected the EU proposal as a disguised barrier to trade. Addressing the subject of international
trade and animal welfare is, as Hobbes et al. (2002) have said, a task that takes time and tortuous
negotiations among WTO members.
Over the past two decades, the EU has made signiﬁcant progress in terms of animal protection,
with the recognition of animals as sentient beings. At the same time, Brazil has become one of the
world’s biggest meat producers and exporters. We argue that a study on the dyad perspective of
European and Brazilian interactions can shed some light on how animal welfare has advanced
within international relations (IR). With the objective of identifying and analysing actors and
mechanisms currently involved in the articulation of animal welfare policies between Europe
and Brazil, we created an analytical framework based on a combination of diplomatic studies
and the global governance literature. According to scholars of diplomatic studies, the traditional
state-centric approach of IR is no longer sufﬁcient to capture patterns and trends in governance
within modern world politics (Hernandez-Lopez, 2001; Hocking, 2006; Pigman, 2005; Stone,
2004). With the growing numbers of actors other than government trade ministry ofﬁcials who
nowadays embody a certain de facto diplomatic status, as described by Kelley (2010), it is necess-
ary to account for the initiatives of state and non-state actors in our investigation of EU–BR
relations. Likewise, Falkner (2003) and Vogel (2008) refer to the current reconﬁguration of inter-
national politics not as a straightforward power shift away from state towards non-state forms of
policy-making, but rather a movement towards a more complex relationship between private and
public actors. In addition to identifying which actors within EU–BR relations are exerting efforts
to coordinate farm animal welfare policies, this article aims to analyse how such efforts are
exerted, or which mechanisms are employed. To do so, we rely upon the global governance lit-
erature. Within this literature, we ﬁnd several studies concerned with how policies, ideas and
instruments spread across nations that take place beyond the reach of the multilateral negotiation
and unilateral coercion that are traditional of diplomatic studies.
In Section 2, we further detail our analytical framework. Next, we introduce our research
design for investigating how European actors (known as world frontrunners on animal welfare)
and Brazilian actors (known as the world’s biggest exporters of meat) have attempted to
advance animal welfare-related issues in their relations with each other. Our ﬁndings are pre-
sented in Section 4. Discussions about the ﬁndings are included in Sections 5 and 6, and our con-
cluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
2. World trade politics: drafting an analytical framework
Traditionally, theorists of IR have interpreted nation-states as the main or even sole actors in
world politics. Hence, to explain patterns and trends in world politics, this body of research
has largely focused on the role of appointed emissaries of nation-state governments and their dip-
lomatic institutions. In terms of commercial diplomacy in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round,
this state-centric approach resulted in a research focus on the newly created WTO and its
primary actors, who are ministers (who meet at least once every two years) ambassadors and del-
egates (who meet regularly in Geneva). However, the environment in which ‘diplomacy’ is exer-
cised has changed drastically over the last decade (Heine, 2006; Hocking, 2006; Kelley, 2010;
Murray, Sharp, Wiseman, Criekemans, & Melissen, 2011; Pigman &Vickers, 2012). This
environment includes a broad range of actors, among which non-governmental organisations
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(NGOs) and multinational corporations are currently exerting inﬂuence in diplomatic milieu
(Hocking, 2004; Langhorne, 2005). The emergence of actors other than ofﬁcial diplomats has
allowed for innovative ways to tackle differences and build cooperation between countries in
several policy areas. To understand this changing mode of international trade politics, some scho-
lars have examined the role of NGOs and corporations in trade negotiations and trade disputes (e.
g. Dunoff, 1998; Esty, 1998; Hernandez-Lopez, 2001; Sapra, 2009; Sherman & Eliasson, 2006).
While it is of paramount importance to understand how the outcome of trade negotiations and
disputes can be inﬂuenced by non-governmental actors, we seek a broader perspective to
uncover more subtle ways of exerting inﬂuence over international trade policies and disputes.
Thus, instead of focusing on the activities of non-traditional trade ‘diplomats’ at the conventional
WTO landscape, as the above body of literature does, we propose an investigation into initiatives
outside the WTO used by state and non-state actors to tackle differences and advance rule-making
in relation to cross-border issues.
In striving for a framework that could enable us to comprehensively analyse initiatives in the
ﬁeld of animal welfare in EU–Brazil relations, we combined the Abbott and Snidal (2009) gov-
ernance triangle with the Busch and Jörgens (2005; 2012) triad of global governance mechanisms.
Figure 1 illustrates our proposed analytical framework.
As mentioned above, a number of different types of actors are currently engaged in initiatives
that aim to advance policy-making at the international level. The Abbott and Snidal (2009) gov-
ernance triangle offers taxonomy for these initiatives based on the participants. In Abbott and
Snidal’s governance triangle, each pole represents one group of actors – state, civil society and
market – and the surface represents the policy-making space. Taking Abbott and Snidal’s govern-
ance triangle as a methodological guide enables us to adequately account for the governance
activity of ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors in IR studies. We are interested in identifying initiatives
carried out by government ofﬁcials and activities driven by civil society actors such as NGOs
and epistemic communities as well as activities led by market actors like transnational corpor-
ations and ﬁnancial institutions. In addition to taxonomy for actors, we felt the need for a taxon-
omy of mechanisms to enable us to assess the manner used by each actor’s initiative. Busch and
Jörgens (2005; 2012) proposed a typology of three broad classes of mechanisms: harmonisation,
imposition and diffusion. In our analytical framework, Busch and Jörgens’ (2005; 2012) typology
of global governance mechanisms comes in the form of added pillars at the base of the governance
Figure 1. Framework for analysing modern world trade governance.
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triangle. Within that context, the harmonisation pillar refers to cooperative mechanisms that are
driven by common interests and where parties take joint decisions through highly centralised pro-
cesses; the second pillar (imposition) refers to coercive mechanisms where one party exploits an
asymmetry in political or economic power to unilaterally place a condition upon the other party;
and the last pillar refers to an emerging mechanism that enables actors and institutions to trigger
domestic policy change in countries through policy diffusion. Bush and Jörgens’ typology comes
close to what other scholars have classiﬁed as domestic policy change through international inter-
action and convergence (e.g. Bennett, 1991; Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Börzel & Risse, 2012;
Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Knill, 2005; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009;
Schimmelfennig, 2007). However, Bush and Jörgens view diffusion as a facilitating factor rather
than an outcome of policy convergence. Normally, policy diffusion is conceived as an effect of
convergence mechanisms, such as institutional membership wherein legally binding requirements
deﬁned in international agreements trigger a socially mediated spread of policies. Within Busch
and Jörgens’ perspective, it is possible to account for a reverse process. To them, policy diffusion
is a distinctive mechanism of global governance, whereby the international spread of policy inno-
vations is driven by information ﬂows (rather than by hierarchical or collective decision-making
within international institutions). That is, the dissemination of knowledge, values, norms and
ideas across nations can trigger international processes to enable legally binding harmonisation
requirements.
By combining Abbott and Snidal’s (2009) governance triangle with Busch and Jörgens’
(2005; 2012) typology of global governance mechanisms, we can interrelate actors and mechan-
isms and thus better assess the governance initiatives in the area of animal welfare that fall outside
the traditional multilateral WTO trade agreements. We now introduce our case study.
3. An outline of the case study
Concerns about the treatment of farm animals have been the subject of signiﬁcant regulatory and
policy attention, especially in Europe where in the last 40 years a comprehensive governance
structure was enacted to safeguard the welfare of farm animals at farms, during transport and
at slaughter. This self-imposition of legislation for the protection of animals has, according to
several studies (e.g. Grethe, 2007; Hobbs et al., 2002; Van Horne and Achterbosch, 2008),
increased costs for EU livestock producers, thus placing European products at a competitive dis-
advantage relative to imported products from other countries. Consequently, European farmers
and European agri-cooperatives began to put pressure on the European Commission to ensure
that equal animal welfare regulations were required for imported products (Copa-Cogeca,
2012). NGOs of animal protection have also argued that animal products from other countries
(which are generally regarded as facing lower welfare requirements) must follow EU equivalent
standards, not only to avoid the losses of EU producers but also to respect consumers’ ethical
demands (Eurogroup, 2000). However, to ban or restrict the import of products based on
animal welfare grounds raises critical disagreements within the international trade community.
As the recent EC–Seal Products1 case illustrated, adopting animal welfare measures consistent
with the WTO legal framework is not an easy task. Although the EU ban on the marketing of
seal products was considered to be justiﬁed under GATT Article XX (a) public morals exception,
the Appellate Body concluded that the measure did not meet the chapeau requirements of GATT
Article XX. Therefore, the EU was required to alter its measures in order to adequately comply
with its multilateral trade obligations.
Extensive literature suggests that in a growing number of ﬁelds, frustration with the dynamics
of the multilateral trade system has stimulated the use of innovative ways to advance rule-making
in relation to cross-border issues. To ﬁnd out whether animal welfare is one of these ﬁelds we
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pursued a case study in the dyad perspective of EU–BR relations. The reasons for looking at the
relation of European actors with Brazilian actors are that Brazil is the single biggest exporter of
agricultural products to the EU (European Commission, 2013) and that Brazil represents an emer-
ging international political and economic actor with whom the EU desires to enhance its relations
(European Commission, 2007). The research followed a qualitative design in which data for
mapping the IR between Europe and Brazil in the context of animal welfare were collected
through a set of semi-structured interviews with individuals and organisations from the state,
civil society (NGOs and researchers), and the private sector (producer associations, cattle
farmers, slaughterhouses, retailers, restaurant chains). In total, 40 actors from a range of organis-
ations were interviewed, face-to-face or via video calls, using a semi-structured interview guide.
In Brazil, 29 interviews were conducted during the period of January to April 2012, including
respondents from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) (9), the Min-
istry of Foreign Relations (2), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Institute (EMBRAPA) (2), the
Association of Brazilian Beef Exporters (ABIEC) (1); the Brazilian Poultry Association
(UBABEF) (2), the Brazilian Pork Industry and Exporter Association (ABIPECS) (1), slaughter-
houses that export to the EU market (3), farmers (3), academic experts (4) and representatives of
European NGOs working in Brazil (2).
In Europe, 11 interviews took place between September and December 2012, including
respondents from the Directorate General of Health and Consumers of the European Commission
(DGSanco) (1), the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) (2), the European retail and whole-
sale association (EuroCommerce) (1), the European farmers and European agri-cooperatives
(Copa-Cogeca) (2), the European livestock and Meat Trades Union (UECBV) (2), World
Society for the Protection of Animals2 (WSPA) (1), Compassion In World Farming (1), and
the Eurogroup for Animals (1). Furthermore, informal discussions were held with representatives
of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the European Food and Veterinary Ofﬁce
(FVO), the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), Safe Supply of
Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE), Business Benchmark on Farm Animal Welfare
(BBFAW) and with a representative of the animal welfare unit of the Chilean Agricultural and
Livestock Service (SAG) during the following conferences: Enforcement of EU animal
welfare-related legislation (Brussels, Belgium, 12–13 June 2012), the third OIE Global Confer-
ence on Animal Welfare (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 6–8 November 2012) and the OIE Regional
Conference on Animal Welfare and International Trade (Montevideo, Uruguay, 17–18 October
2013).
4. Advancing farm animal welfare: ﬁndings from EU–Brazil
In this section we describe some empirical observations regarding initiatives that are advancing
the ﬁeld of farm animal welfare within EU–Brazil relations. Our ﬁndings are presented in accord-
ance with the edges of the governance triangle and thus are subdivided in the three subsections.
Despite this analytical distinction, we acknowledge that some initiatives involved more than one
type of actor.
4.1. Initiatives within international governmental relations
In Europe, the EU Directorate-DGTrade is the authority within the European Commission to
engage in international trade negotiations. Maintaining trade relations with other countries is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission; individual Member States are not allowed
to create trade policy on their own. As far as the protection of the welfare of animals is concerned,
the general position of the Commission is that animal welfare is a legitimate non-tariff measure
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that must be addressed in the negotiation of trade agreements. Therefore, DG Trade made several
efforts at the beginning of the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round to include animal
welfare measures in the debates. However, as negotiations over agriculture grew more heated
and complicated, DG Trade’s rhetoric on animal welfare measures became less strident. Conver-
sely, the inclusion of animal welfare is being strongly pushed by DG Trade in the negotiation of
bilateral and regional trade agreements. In the recent re-launched negotiations between the EU
and Mercosur for an Interregional Association Agreement, European delegates have insisted
on including animal welfare measures in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) chapter of the
agreement. However, this proposal faces resistance from Brazilian delegates and other
Members of Mercosur who are of the opinion that dealing with animal welfare measures
within the scope of trade measures related to SPS issues might negatively affect access to the
European market for products of animal origin. It remains to be seen what the outcome of the
EU–Mercosur bilateral trade agreement negotiations will be.
Parallel to the above-described diplomatic relations, the membership of the OIE formed an
outstanding channel of interaction between Brazilian and European ofﬁcials in the area of
animal welfare. Originally an intergovernmental organisation exclusively dedicated to improving
animal health by ﬁghting animal diseases at the global level, OIE expanded its mandate to include
animal welfare at the request of its Member Countries. Following the determination of animal
welfare as a priority in the OIE 2001–2005 Strategic Plan, the World Assembly of OIE Delegates
(representing the 180 Member Countries and Territories) adopted eight animal welfare standards
into the Terrestrial Code and three into the OIE Aquatic Animal Health Standards Code. It is
important to note that OIE, along with the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International
Plant Protection Convention, is one of the so-called ‘three sisters’, whose standards, guidelines
and recommendations are speciﬁcally recognised in the World Trade Organization’s SPS agree-
ment. As such, OIE standards are references to international standards for animal health and zoo-
nosis. However, the same status is not (yet) given to OIE animal welfare standards because
measures of animal welfare are thought to fall outside the scope of the SPS agreement. In that
regard, it is important to note that there is no authoritative interpretation regarding the inapplic-
ability of the SPS Agreement for animal welfare measures. There are only remarks in some docu-
ments and scientiﬁc articles such as Prevost (2008, footnote) and the G/SPS/GEN/932. Parallel to
that, it is relevant to add that OIE guidelines are currently being used as a basis for the develop-
ment of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) technical speciﬁcation for
animal welfare. ISO is an NGO with the national standards bodies of more than 160 countries
as Members. In July 2011, OIE and ISO signed a cooperation agreement with the aim of facilitat-
ing collaboration between these organisations to develop voluntary international standards on
animal welfare. The idea was to promote international harmonisation of animal welfare standards
for food-producing animals as a way to prevent the multiplication of private schemes and certi-
ﬁcation systems.
Particularly relevant to note is that ofﬁcials participating in OIE and ISO are not career diplo-
mats. Unlike the WTO, which is a forum for emissaries from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
(from DGTrade in the case of EU), the OIE is a forum for the Veterinary Services of each
Member. Thus, government ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food
Supply (MAPA) are representing Brazil and Europe is represented by government ofﬁcials
from the Veterinary Service of each EU Member State. The Directorate General of Health and
Consumers of the European Commission (DG-Sanco), which is the EU authority to propose legis-
lation and adopt policies in the area of animal welfare, is an active participant in OIE activities,
though it holds no voting right over OIE standards as this is an exclusive prerogative of EU
Member States. As for ISO, those who participate in the development of technical speciﬁcations
for animal welfare measures are representatives of national standardisation bodies,3 government
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ofﬁcials engaged in OIE animal welfare standard-setting and experts named by international
organisations with a liaison status within the ISO animal welfare working group. These organis-
ations are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International
Dairy Federation, the International Meat Secretariat, the International Egg Commission, and the
Eurogroup for Animals, the WSPA and the SSAFE.4 The latter organisation has taken the lead by
ofﬁcially proposing an ISO standard on animal welfare.
The United Nations FAO is another multi-stakeholder platform that engages internationally in
animal welfare matters with the aim of establishing good animal welfare practices. As an inter-
governmental organisation, the membership of FAO consists of sovereign states and regional
economic integration organisations like the EU. Yet, programmes developed by FAO usually
involve partnerships between governments, civil society representatives and the private sector.
This is also the case for animal welfare capacity-building programmes, where local experts
from different stakeholders are brought together to create mutual understanding on animal
welfare issues. The capacity-building programmes in Brazil resulted in a joint effort from
MAPA, the Ethology and Animal Ecology Research Group (ETCO) from the UNESP University
and WSPA.
Finally, there are two important stand-alone channels, where the interaction between Euro-
pean and Brazilian actors does not rely on the common membership of Brazil and the EU. The
ﬁrst channel refers to establishment approval, which is the process used by importing countries
to grant market access for imported products of animal origin. This process is based on individual
countries’ compliance with the importing country’s requirements for food safety and quality. The
conformity assessment for establishment approval is usually the responsibility of the veterinary
services of the exporting country, whose ﬁrst step is to make a list of establishments that are eli-
gible for selling products in the market of the importing country. To ensure that the conformity
assessment fully complies with the importing country’s regulations, periodical audits are carried
out on the spot by the importing country’s ofﬁcial authorities. Thus, the establishment approval
provides a mechanism for the exchange of expertise between veterinary ofﬁcials from importing
and exporting countries because they often interact while working towards the recognition of the
latter’s national control system. In the case of exporting animal products from Brazil to the Euro-
pean market, establishment approval promotes interaction between veterinary agents from the
Department of Inspection of Products of Animal Origin (DIPOA) of the Brazilian Ministry of
Agriculture and the European FVO, which is the Commission inspection service of DG-Sanco.
For instance relevant in terms of animal welfare is compliance with European Regulation
1099/2009, which sets standards for the protection of animals at the time of killing. These stan-
dards are indispensable and must be checked by Brazilian authorities when evaluating eligible
establishments. When FVO ofﬁcers come to check compliance, a sample of farms are inspected
to conﬁrm compliance. Conversely, in the case of exports from Europe to the Brazilian market,
the interaction during the process of establishment approval is between ofﬁcials from DIPOA and
the veterinary service of the speciﬁc country from which the product originates. For instance, if
the establishment seeking to sell animal products to Brazil is located in the Netherlands, the com-
pliance check with Brazilian import requirements will be carried by the Dutch national competent
authority or the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA).
The second stand-alone channel providing a bridge for government ofﬁcials from Brazil and
the EU to advance animal welfare policies and practices is a recently signed Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU). This memorandum provides a formal framework for technical cooperation
in the area of animal welfare between MAPA and DG-Sanco. According to this memorandum, the
parties agree to exchange scientiﬁc knowledge and technical information about the welfare of
farm animals in order to facilitate understanding and future negotiations about farm animal
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welfare matters on both sides. Meetings in order to discuss and coordinate activities and projects
relevant to this administrative memorandum are currently taking place, with unknown outcomes.
4.2. Initiatives within international civil society relations
The linkages providing opportunities for civil society actors to engage in the development and
promotion of international animal welfare standards and guidelines originate either in inter-
national organisations (e.g. FAO, OIE, ISO, WTO) or at a more practical level. Illustrative
examples in the case of EU–Brazil include the active participation of WSPA, an originally
British organisation, in the Brazilian development of animal welfare policies and practices and
the exchange of visiting professors and researchers between the European and Brazilian scientiﬁc
institutions.
To ensure that animal welfare is addressed within the Brazilian livestock farming systems,
WSPA engages with farmers, companies, producer associations, universities and governmental
authorities. For instance, WSPA together with MAPA launched in 2009 STEPs, a National
Program for Humane Slaughter. The programme includes training for federal inspectors and
slaughterhouse personnel in animal-friendly pre-slaughter handling. The content of the training
addresses animal welfare issues during the loading, unloading and pre-slaughter handling as stipu-
lated by Brazilian law, OIE recommendation and EU regulations and directives. By late 2013, over
1128 professionals from 250 processing plants had already participated in the training. Another
example is the partnership between WSPA, the Food Animal Initiative and researchers from
ETCO for the development of The Model Farm Project located in Jaboticabal (Sao Paulo,
Brazil). The Model Farm aims to demonstrate to governments and the public that humane and sus-
tainable farming is a practical reality. As a centre of excellence for good farm animal welfare prac-
tice, the farm acts as a base for many welfare training programmes and research projects.
Scientiﬁc collaboration has also been a part of the Welfare Quality® project, an EU-funded
project aimed at the development of reliable on-farm monitoring systems, product information
systems and practical species-speciﬁc strategies to improve animal welfare. The project started
in May 2004 with 40 institutions in Europe and incorporated four Latin America research insti-
tutes in 2006. The Brazilian participant was the Department of Animal Science Faculty of Agri-
culture and Veterinary Sciences from the Universidade Nacional do Estado de Sao Paulo
(UNESP). The objective of bringing non-EU institutions on board was to broaden the collabor-
ation among animal welfare specialists to develop, reﬁne, standardise and calibrate welfare
measures and to identify and validate practical remedial measures. Technical visits and work-
shops are another channel to enhance cooperation between European and Brazilian universities.
For instance, students and professors from the Livestock Department of the Wageningen Univer-
sity and Research Centre (WUR) have visited farms and slaughterhouses in Brazil to discuss local
experiences of beef cattle welfare during transport. Additionally, the School of Veterinary
Sciences from Bristol University (United Kingdom) often welcomes research fellows from
Brazil into their Animal Welfare and Behaviour research programme.
4.3. Initiatives within international economic relations
The growing commitment of companies to operate their businesses in a socially responsible
manner is providing several opportunities for improving animal welfare worldwide. An increas-
ing number of food companies (retailers, service companies, manufacturers, processors and pro-
ducers) have started to integrate farm animal welfare into their management systems (Amos and
Sullivan, 2013). For example, McDonald’s, KFC, Burger King, Wendy’s, Subway, Unilever,
Nestlé, Cargill, Tesco, Royal Ahold, Carrefour, Safeway, Marks&Spencer and many other
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major international food companies and retailers have publicly communicated their commitment
to the welfare of animals across their food supply chain. Consequently, these companies increas-
ingly require suppliers to ensure compliance with animal welfare practices. The process of setting
these standards can be ﬁrm based, NGO based, or a joint venture. For instance, individual
schemes for animal welfare standards have been developed by Carrefour (named Filière
Qualité) and by McDonald’s. Freedom Food and Beter Leven are examples of animal welfare
standards that are developed by animal protection NGOs. These animal welfare standards have
been incorporated in the brand of the major Dutch food retailer Royal Ahold. An example of a
collectively developed standard is the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice
(GlobaGAP) and the British Retail Consortium (BRC). Against this background, the main
cross-national economic channel that appeared in our empirical investigation was the client–sup-
plier relation. That is, the contractual relation between one of the above food companies and a
Brazilian processing plant serves as a channel through which alignment between client animal
welfare policies and supplier animal handling practices is established. For instance, Marfrig,
one of the largest Brazilian food processing companies, supplies processed meat to McDonald’s,
KFC, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Waitrose. As such, Mafrig must abide by a commercial contract
with these companies to comply with speciﬁc animal welfare guidelines.
Another channel connecting European andBrazilianmarket actors in theﬁeld of animalwelfare
is the Brazilian Roundtable on Sustainable Livestock. Created in late 2007 and formally constituted
in June 2009, this roundtable works as a multi-stakeholder platform that discusses ways to ensure
that livestock operations in Brazil are conducted in a socially just, environmentally friendly and
economically viable manner. The Brazilian Roundtable is attended by representatives of industries
and industry organisations, associations of farmers, retailers, banks, civil society organisations,
ﬁnancial institutions, research centres and universities. Among the participant members are the
International Finance Corporation, Rabobank Group and Banco Santander. These are international
ﬁnancial institutions, which have recently decided to take farm animal welfare issues into account
in their investment decisions. The growing interest of investors in how companies in the food sector
manage farm animal welfare is associated with NGO pressure and reputational damage that can
occur for companies whose standards and practices have fallen short of the NGO’s and other sta-
keholder’s expectations (Sullivan, Amos,&Ngo, 2012;Wagemans, vanKoppen, &Mol, 2014). In
this context, investors have begun to exert inﬂuence on the companies in which they invest by
encouraging them to follow the animal welfare recommendations of OIE, FAO, the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Animals and/or the animal welfare directives of the EU. To help inves-
tors assess the performance of companies on farm animal welfare-related issues, a global
benchmark project has been initiated by two of the world’s largest animal welfare NGOs:
WSPA and the Compassion in World Farming. The BBFAW evaluates company performance
in managing farm animal welfare across three pillars: Management Commitment and Policy, Gov-
ernance and Policy Implementation and Leadership and Innovation. The initial evaluation in 2012
assessed 68 global food companies and concluded that farm animal welfare is receiving far less
attention than other corporate social responsibility issues. According to Nicky Amos and Sullivan
(2012), the Business Benchmark’s programme director, even though over 70% of the assessed
companies acknowledge farm animal welfare as a business issue, many have yet to publish a
formal policy and fewer still have speciﬁc commitments in this area.
5. Innovative paths for farm animal welfare
As elaborated above, world trade policy is no longer the exclusive arena of Geneva-based trade
negotiators. The evolving international political landscape is marked by a growing number and
variety of non-diplomatic participants that determine the structures and processes of transnational
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governance. Our empirical investigation revealed that like other policy ﬁelds, there are several
initiatives parallel to the traditional WTO setting that are currently advancing farm animal
welfare policies within IR. We found that within EU–BR there are a string of state and non-
state actors seeking to enhance the development and implementation of animal welfare measures
through distinct channels of interaction. Figure 2 provides a schematic summary of the research
ﬁndings to illustrate current initiatives in animal welfare policy between European and Brazilian
actors.
The ﬁrst interesting insight that comes by looking at the below picture is that although in
theoretical debates there is an implicit tendency of some scholars to link modes of governance
based on harmonisation and imposition with state actors, and civil society and market actors
with modes of governance based on diffusion, we observed an indiscriminate use of modes of
governance among actor categories. That is, governmental ofﬁcials use diffusion mechanisms
as much as non-governmental actors use mechanisms of multilateral harmonisation and unilateral
imposition. In addition to the expected harmonisation via governmental ofﬁcials, we found
BBFAW, GTPS and ISO to be examples of privately driven harmonisation. These organisations
serve as a platform for non-governmental actors collaborating towards the harmonisation of
animal welfare standards in a similar way as the WTO and OIE do when providing instruments
for governmental ofﬁcials to multilaterally harmonise trade-related matters of animal welfare.
Likewise, unilateral conditioning was a form of governance also exercised by both government
agents and private actors. In the ﬁrst case, the example is in conditions set by the European Com-
mission to permit access into the EU market (the establishment approval procedure). In the case of
private actors, the example is in the incorporation of animal welfare standards into commercial
contracts between retailers and suppliers.
Figure 2. Transnational paths of animal welfare politics.
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Another interesting observation coming from the diagram is that diffusion constitutes an
important pillar in the architecture of international trade governance for animal welfare
between Europe and Brazil. The majority of activities through which European and Brazilian
actors are addressing the challenge of developing and implementing equivalent animal welfare
policies and practices seem to be based on knowledge sharing and diffusion. The MoU
between DGSanco and MAPA, the FAO capacity-building programme, the collaboration
between WSPA and MAPA in the STEPS programme, the academic partnership among research-
ers from the Welfare Quality Project, ETCO group and Wageningen University and Research
Centre livestock group, and the promotion of animal welfare practices through ﬁnancial invest-
ments are all channels for the dissemination of information, best practices, policy instruments
and concepts that enhance the development and implementation of measures to protect the
welfare of farm animals. In the context of international law, the above initiatives fall within
the nomenclature of soft instruments. In contrast, treaties and trade agreements that are legally
enforceable commitments and thus considered hard instruments. According to the extensive lit-
erature (e.g. Footer, 2008; Kirton & Trebilcock, 2004; Rahman & Amin, 1999; Ramlogan,
2001; Shelton, 2003; Skjærseth, Stokke, & Wettestad, 2006), soft policy instruments are a suit-
able means to pave the way for subsequent multilateral agreements because of their non-legally
binding character that facilitates cooperation between countries that may not be ready to enter
binding legal agreements on a particular issue. It is then reasonable to expect that initiatives
like the MoU, STEPs that are soft instruments based on knowledge sharing, are laying the ground-
work for future diplomatic alignment in trade-related aspects of animal welfare.
Another ﬁnding from our research indicates that in the ﬁeld of animal welfare the distinction
between soft and hard instruments is becoming blurred. As several other scholars have noted (e.g.
Evans, 1996; Falkner, 2003; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Arentsen, 2009; Henson, 2008; Stoker, 1998;
Vogel, 2008; Wolff & Scannell, 2008) in a range of policy ﬁelds, the boundaries between state
and non-state regulations, soft and hard instruments, voluntary and mandatory regulations, can
no longer be sharply drawn. There are situations where ‘soft laws can become “harder”, and
norms can become more law-like’ (Vogel, 2006, p. 05). In our investigation we observed this
sort of ‘inversion’ in the second pillar of governance modes. The imposition of conditions for
establishment approval is considered to be a form of hard governance, given the obligatory char-
acter of compliance to these conditions to enter the EU market. However, some EU provisions
regarding the need for imported products to meet equivalent animal welfare standards are cur-
rently having their ‘hardiness loosened up’. For instance, Council Directive 2008/119 for the pro-
tection of calves and Directive 2008/120 for the protection of pigs establish that:
In order to be imported into the Community, animals coming from a third country must be
accompanied by a certiﬁcate issued by the competent authority of that country, certifying that they
have received treatment at least equivalent to that granted to animals of Community origin as provided
for by this Directive.
Some of our respondents explained that the above provision is currently not imposed upon
countries exporting to the EU because of the uncertain status of animal welfare measures
under the WTO. Hence, to avoid an international trade conﬂict in the WTO, ofﬁcials from
FVO are taking a cautious approach when imposing this animal welfare measure upon other
countries. Conversely, the incorporation of animal welfare measures in a food company list of
requirements for suppliers is, at least in theory, a soft mode of governance because suppliers
are not required by law to enter into a commercial contract. However, the ‘softness’ of the com-
mercial requirement has ‘stiffened up’ with market concentration. The high level of concentration
among food retailers has generated asymmetric power relations along the chain, so suppliers have
hardly any alternative but to comply with private standards in order to assure market access
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(Konefal, Mascarenhas, & Hatanaka, 2005; Wolff & Scannell, 2008). Hence, some scholars have
suggested that some private standards have become a de facto mandatory import requirement to
access the European market (Busch & Bain, 2004; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2010; Hatanaka, Bain &
Busch, 2005; Henson & Jaffee, 2008; Konefal et al., 2005; Lang & Heasman, 2004; Stanton,
2012; Van Der Meulen, 2011; Wolff & Scannell, 2008). Private standards having the effect of
a hard policy instrument is causing great concern among trade diplomats at the WTO.
6. Private standards: paving the way or deviating from it?
In the context of the global governance of animal protection, the use of private standards has
brought substantial cross-border gains. According to several researchers, the inclusion of
private animal welfare standards in contractual arrangements with suppliers has served as a
major catalyst for the improvement in welfare conditions for animals within and across several
countries (Fulponi, 2006; Lindgreen & Hingley, 2003; Maciel & Bock, 2013; Sansolini,
2008). The quickly evolving role of private standards in the regulation of international trade
has, however, raised a series of questions and concerns regarding a possible deviation from the
rule-based system of the WTO. In other words, there are growing concerns that some WTO
members may be trying to escape their multilateral trade obligations by instructing, promoting
or simply allowing private entities to develop regulatory measures which would otherwise be
inconsistent with WTO regulations.
This discussion reached the WTO in 2005 when the representative of St. Vincent and Grena-
dines reported during a meeting among WTO trade ofﬁcials that compliance with EurepGAP
norms was a de facto condition for exporting bananas to the UK’s supermarkets (see G/SPS/R/
37). Since this meeting, the use of private standards as a means to address quality and safety
food-related issues in exporting countries has become a recurrent topic of discussion at the
SPS Committee of the WTO. Over a dozen reports have been circulated within this committee
addressing the issue of private standards. See, for instance, G/SPS/GEN/802, G/SPS/W/247,
G/SPS/GEN/932, G/SPS/GEN/1100 and G/SPS/W/256. Concerns over the use of private stan-
dards in the ﬁeld of animal health, food safety and animal welfare have also been raised at the
OIE level. Members of the OIE have voiced serious concerns about the potential for private stan-
dards to have trade limiting and trade distorting effects. In contrast with OIE standards that are
developed on the basis of a scientiﬁc risk assessment and adopted through consensus among
all the 180 members the OIE, private standards are adopted on the basis of commercial consider-
ations and thus potentially lead to the discriminatory treatment of certain products or countries.
To prevent the use of private standards from undermining what it is considered ‘the hard won
improvements in market access arrangements’ (Doc G/SPS/GEN/822, item 03), some scholars
and practitioners of international law have suggested that private standards need to be developed
and applied in congruence with the WTO rules. This is, however, a highly contested claim
because there are different interpretations regarding aWTOMember’s responsibility for measures
enacted by non-governmental entities. While some hold the view that WTO Members bear the
responsibility for private standards enacted within their own jurisdiction, others understand
that private standards fall outside the WTO scope (Huige, 2011; Prevost, 2008; Wouters &
Geraets, 2012).
7. Conclusion
Concerns relating to animalwelfare have gained considerable attention across a number of countries.
However, there is still uncertainty about how to accommodate animal welfare measures within the
WTO legal system. This paper, through an empirical investigation with European and Brazilian
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actors, has sought to identify and analyse the current initiatives beyond the WTO that are enabling
countries to reach a common understanding about the development and implementation of animal
welfare policies. Our analytical framework provided uswith a tool for mapping a comprehensive set
of initiatives involving governmental, societal and market actors that serve as alternatives for the
conventional state-based harmonisation model of international trade governance.
From the EU–Brazil case, it can be concluded that knowledge sharing activities constitute a
signiﬁcant governance mechanism used by state and non-state actors to exert inﬂuence over the
development and implementation of equivalent animal welfare practices. However, further
research with different pairs of nations or within the same EU–Brazil relation but on a different
sensitive trade issue, is needed before these empirical ﬁndings can be generalised. What can be
concluded now is that the third pillar of global trade governance provides a path for non-diplo-
matic trade actors to mitigate the current impasse at the WTO regarding trade measures addressing
animal welfare.
Moreover, our study contributes to an ongoing scholarly debate on the ﬂuidity of policy
instruments by providing empirical evidence on the softness of hard instruments (e.g. establish-
ment approval) and the hardness of soft instruments (e.g. commercial contracts). A full analysis of
the consequences of this ﬂuidity falls beyond the scope of this article. However, the idea that
private standards are a means to circumvent international trade obligations is a cause for
concern. While scientiﬁc and technical cooperation could enhance the chance for future agree-
ment on this matter at the WTO level, private standards, on the other hand, could potentially jeo-
pardise relations among WTO Members and hamper future legal trade agreements.
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Notes
1. European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products.
2. This organisation has recently changed its name from World Animal Protection.
3. The Brazilian National organization for standardization is ABNT. To consult the national organization
from other countries look at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members.htm.
4. SSAFE is a not-for-proﬁt organization with a membership comprising food companies that operate across
global food supply chains. Current members include: Cargill, Danone, Fonterra, Keystone Foods, McDo-
nald’s, Nestle Purina, PetCare, Pﬁzer Animal Health and The Coca-Cola Company.
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